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IN 'THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
HOWARD C. TEAGUE,
Plaintiff,

-vs.THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN
~~KD FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
~1 ATE OF UTAH, and :MILTON
C. BRANDON,

Case No. 8232

1

Defendants.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS

STATE~IENT

OF FACTS

Defendants are able to agree with the facts as stated
in plaintiff's brief as far as accuracy of the matters
stated is concerned. However, the facts as stated are not
complete in all details pertinent, and defendants, therefore, make the following additional statement of pertinent facts.
The record reveals that counsel for defendant Brandon in the Civil Case No. 99973, filed a notice of intention
to move for the entry of default. In the notice, it is re-
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cited that the Affidavit, Notice, AffidaYit of l\failing and
Complaint were actually served on the plaintiff, Howard
C. Teague, at his address, Route 1, :Mooresboro, North
Carolina. Exhibit "~" in the san1e case, reveals that the
notice was actually served on the 24th day of October,
1953, the exhibit being a return receipt frmn the United
States Post Office Department.
Exhibit "1" is a photostatic copy of the 1\Iotor Ye-

?)),

Tl
1

~DI

hicle Accident Report showing the result of the investigation by State Highway Patrolman D. C. Jenner. It reveals that the automobile owned by plaintiff and involved
in the accident in which defendant Brandon was injured,
was a 1948 :Mercury Coupe automobile with a 1952license

]

plate, #571540, frorn the State of North Carolina. The
san1e accident report reveals that Teague's address was
Deseret Chmnical Depot. The affidavit of counsel for
plaintiff and the testimony of said attorney, reveals that
he had no personal knowledge of the intentions or resi-

!!nl

dence of Howard C. Teague (R-14, 21).
Deseret Che1nical Depot is a rnited States military
reservation, the address of which is Tooele County, rtah.

No evidence was submitted that Teague ever resided at
any place other than on the I'"nited States 1nilitary reser-

\1

.!

vation. The affidavit of 1nailing recites that the last
lmown address of plaintiff Teague was "Sgt. Howard C.
Teague, Deseret Chemical Depot, Tooele County, Utah.
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STATE.MENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE RESIDENCE OF A PERSON IS A FACTUAL QUESTION.

POINT II.
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING THAT TEAGUE
WAS A NONRESIDENT IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE.

ARGU1IENT
POINrr I.
THE RESIDENCE OF A PERSON IS A FACTUAL QUESTION.

vVhether or not a person is a resident or nonresident
of the State of ('" tah is a question of fact which must be
decided by the trier of the fact on the evidence which is
presented for his consideration. This basic and fundamental proposition seeins to be undisputed by the plaintiff and the cases "·hich he cites all are concerned with
resolving the basic proposition of whether or not the
evidence presented forms a basis for the finding as made.
Examples of this basic consideration are illustrated
by plaintiff's brief. The case of Suit

Shailer, 18 Fed.
568, which is cited at pages 7 and 14 of plaintiff's brief,
was concerned with an examination of the facts surrounding the establishment of a residence. In examining this
t,·.
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question, the Court states that the facts 1nust be examined
to see whether or not the person wa~ in good faith a rt>~i
dent of the State in which he was sued as a nonresident
and then stated as follows, page 571:

,.,:;, * * Thus, in Shaeffer v. Gilbert, supra, the
~Iaryland

Court of Appeals, in discussing the
characteristics of residence for the exercise of
political rights, said (page 71 of 73 J\Id., 20 A.
434, 435): 'It does not n1ean, as we have said,
one's pern1anent place of abode, where he intends
to live all his days, or for an indefinite or unlin1ited time; nor does it Inean one's residence for
a temporary purpose, with the intention of returning to his fonner residence when that purpose
shall have been accon1plished, but means, as we
understand it, one's actual home, in the sense of
having no other home, whether he intends to reside there permanently, or for a definite or indefinite length of time.' The f.;upreme Court of
:Jiassachusetts, by Chief Justice Rugg, in Jenkins
v. North Shore Dye House, Inc., 277 i\fass. 440, 17S
N.E. 644, 646, in defining the term 'residence' in
a statute requiring registration of nwtor vehicles,
said : ' "Residence'' means in general a personal
presence at s01ne place of abode with no present
intention of definite and early renwval and with a
purpose to remain for an undetennined period, not
infrequently but not necessarily c01nhined with a
design to stay permanently'."
The courts of California have on several occasions
examined questions of residency as far as military personnel are concerned. These California decisions all
den1onstrate that the pri1nary question is a question of
fact to be determined by the trier of the fact on evidence
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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presented to him. ~~rhe most recent case which defendants
discover is the case of Briggs v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 81 Cal. App. 2nd 240, 183 Pac. 2nd 758.
In the Briggs case, the nonresident motorist statute was
under consideration. The daimed nonresident was a man
who had been a member of the naval service but had since
been discharged to civilian life. A considerable amount of
evidence was presented concerning the intentions and
desires of the person it was claimed was a nonresident.
The length of time the person stayed within the State
of California; the place where he resided; whether or not
he registered his car in California; whether or not he
moved his wife and furniture to California; and all the
other facts surrounding the sojourn in California were
discussed. 'The Court determined that Briggs was 'a nonresident even though he had established a place of residence and was residing within the State of California at
the time of the collision giving rise to the lawsuit against
him.
The test used in California is that the residency n1ust
be more than just a temporary stay within the State, it
must be a stay of an indefinite length with intention to
make a home. The Stttit v. Shailer case cited by plaintiff
and many other authorities, including prior California
cases, were examined. One of the cases examined in the
Briggs case is Berger r. Sup£Yrior Court, 79 Cal. App.
~d ±25, 179 Pac. 2nd 600, which sets down the basic rules
governing the determination of whether or not a person
is a resident. 'The general principles applicable are set
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down with particularity and defendants submit that those
principles are applicable to the case at bar. The California ~\ppellate Court stated the principles as follows,
page 601:
"Respondent points out that Section 404 d<ws
not contain any definition of the term 'nonresident' and argues that the general laws of California n1ust be consulted for the purpose of detennining whether a person is a resident or nonresident within the meaning of said section. NPction 2-13 and 2-1--t of the Government Code provide
as follows:
'Every person ha:-:, in la\\·, a residence.
•In determining the place of residence the
following rules are to be obserYed:
'(a) It is the place where one remains
when not called elsewhere for labor or other
special or ten1pora.ry purpose, and to which
he returns in seasons of repose.
'(b)

There can only be one residence.

' (c) A residence can not be lost until
another is gained.

* * * *
'(g) The residence can be changed only
by the union of act and intent.'
"Counsel for respondent argues that a change
of residence is obtained hv act and intent and
that the 1nere fact that a ·soldier in the armed
forces was stationed at a place and lived there
did not establish such place as his residence. He
argues further that a soldier has no choice as to
his dwelling place and that the fact that he reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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mains in any one place for a considerable length
of tin1e is merely a fortuitous circumstance. He
cites the case of Johnston v. Benton, 73 Cal. App.
565, at page 569, 239 P. 60, at page ·62, where the
court said:

'It is well settled that the domicile of a
person is in no way affected by his enlistment in the civil, n1ilita.ry, or naval service
of his country; and he does not thereby abandon or lose his domicile which he had when
he entered the service, nor does he acquire
one at the place where he serves. 9 R.C.L.
551; Ste,vart Y. Kyser, 105 Cal. 459, 39 P. 19;
People ex rel. Budd v. Holden, 28 Cal. ( 123)
1:2±; Estate of Gordon, 142 Cal. 125, 75 P.
672; Percy Y. Percy, 188 Cal. (765) 768, 207
P. 369. True, the fact of his being on military
duty does not preclude him, if he so desires,
from establishing residence where he is stationed (Percy v. Perc~-, supdt); but the uncontradicted evidence here is that such wa~
not Benton's desire - that he never had any
intention of doing so'."
The cases cited both hy plaintiff and defendant demonstrate beyond refutation that the question of whether
or not a person is a resident or nonresident is one of fact
to be determined by the trier of the fact based on the evidence submitted. Defendants submit that such is the
undisputed law applicable to the case at bar.

POINT II.
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING THAT TEAGUE
WAS A NONRESIDENT IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE.
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The facts recited by both the brief of plaintiff and
the brief of defendant were largely undisputed. It would
appear that the following are salient undisputed fach;
for consideration by this Court.
1. That Ho-ward C. Teague at all tirnes he \vas present in the State of Utah \Vas a rnernber of the United
States Armed Forces.
:2. That at all times Howard C. Teague was within
the State of lTtah, he actually lived on the Deseret Chemical Depot, a rnilitary reservation located in Tooele County, Utah.

3. That Howard C. Teague was driving an automobile which he owned and which was registered in the
State of North Carolina and carr~nng Korth Carolina
license plates.

±. That Howard C. Teague returned to the State
of :North Carolina, his hon1e, and was residing there at
the tirne plaintiff con1n1enced his action in the State of
Utah.
5. That there is no evidence that Howard C. Teague
ever intended to n1ake the State of Vtah his home or to
re8ide within the State of Utah pernranently or for any
indefinite length of time.
6. That there is no evidence that Howard C. Teague
ever lived at any place other than a military reservation
under jurisdiction of the United States while present
within the State of Utah.
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The recited propositions are uncontradicted and are
the basis for a finding by the trier of the fact that Howard C. Teague was not a resident of the State of Utah
but was, in fact, a nonresident within the 1neaning of
that term as it is used in the "1\Iotor Yehicle Code.
~rhe

fundamental difference between plaintiff and
defendants' concept of the problem confronting this
Court involves the significance of actual presence within
the boundaries of the State. Fnder military order, such
presence is involunhu~, and temporary. Defendants submit it is not sufficient to support any inference that the
soldier intends to be a resident. It has always been the
law that a soldier or sailor does not acquire a new resicL•nce merely hy being stationed at a particular place.
His residence reinains the same as when he entered the
service unless there is shown a clear and une(1uivocal
intention to change residence. I~wtc Island r. Firrnwll's
Fwzd Indemnity CoJIIpan.u, 30 Cal. 2nd 3-l-1, 18-± Pac. :2nd
153, 17:1 A.L.R. 896; Commercial Credit Cor1J. u. 8}}/ith,
1S7 S.\Y. 2nd 3G3, 158 A.L.R. 1-±7-1-. See also discussion
under Point I of Berger v. SII}Jerior Court (supra) pages
3, 6 and 7.
~rhe proposition of residence of persons in the Armed
Forces has been the subject of a lengthy and exhaustive
annotation which is contained in 1-l-8 A.L.H. commencing
at page 1-t 13. All of the cases cited in the annotation seem
to agree on one basic and fundamental proposition. It is
that the 1uere presence of a soldier or ;-;ailor within the
State on a military reservation is not evidence of inten-
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tion to change his residence fron1 the plaet> of induction
to the place where he i~ stationed on lnilitary duty. rrJtprp
n1ust be shown an unequivocal and clear intention that
a change of residence occur. In the absence of the showing of a clear and unequiyocal intention, the residence
of the soldier or ~ailor ren1ains the n·sidence which he
had at the c01n1nencement of his n1ilitary duty.
Applying these principles to the undisputed fad~
recited, it appears that there is no showing of any intention on the part of plaintiff Teague to change his residence fron1 the State of N" orth Carolina to the State of
Utah. The evidence is to the contrary and :-;hows a clear
and unequivocal intention not to change his residence.
Teague had his automobile registered within the State
of North Carolina. and it was so registered at the time
of the accident injuring defendant Brandon. He returned
to the State of North Carolina where he was actually
served with the papers required to perfect service on
nonresidenb. The facts are mnply sufficient to provide
a. basis for the finding by the Court that Howard C.
Teague was a nonresident of the State of rtah on August
-+, 1952 and that the statutes of the State of Utah permitting the se1Tice on ~reague hy service on the Secretary
of State were applicable.
Plaintiff cites and relies heavily on the case of Booth
Crockett, District Judge, 110 Ptah 336, 173 Pac. 2nd
G-:!7, and submits that this Court's detennination of the
1neaning of the words "usual place of abode" and "resir.
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dence" should be the same. He requests the Court to
decide that a person in the Armed Services stationed
within the State of Utah autmnatically is a resident of
the State of Utah. This proposition defendants submit
is palpably falicious. In the Booth decision, this Court
adopted the meaning of "place of abode" which had been
attributed to those words by the Supreme Court of N e'v
.Jersey. In its decision, the Court cites Grant r. Lazcrcuce, 37 L"tah -!50, 108 Pac. 931, 933. rrhe language there
quoted was from the K ew J erse~, case of J/ ygaU c. Coe,
63 X ..J'.L. :J10, 51:?, -!-! A. 198. The Booth decision also
recites and quotes the later case of !{w-illa r. Roth, 13:2
X..J.L. 213, 38 A. :?nd 862. The definition which had been
set forth for "place of abode" in X ew Jersey was much
more restrictive than is used for the definition of the
word ''residence.'' The cases in N" ew Jersey and Booth
c. C ro(Iett, all sa~, that "place of abode" means the place
where the person is actually living and abiding at the
time service is attempted. The residence need not be
the placl' where the person is actuall~, residing and abiding and ma~,, in fact, he some other place than the place
the peTson is aetually located. The restrictive meaning
of the phrase "place of abode" is unmistakenly set forth
in this Court's decision in Booth

L

Crockett. The langu-

age is as follows, page 649:
'' 'The Statute does not direct service to Le
made, at the 'residence' of the defendant, hut at
his dwelling house or usual place of abode, which
is a 1nuch more resh·icted term. .\ s was said in
Stout v. Leonard, 37 N .•J.L. -!92, Iwln~, persons
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have ~everal residenc-Ps, which tllPy permanPntly
1naintain, occupying one at one period of the year
and one at another period. \Vhere such conditions
exist, a sumnwns nm~t be serve at tlze dwelliu[!
house in 1rhicl1 the defendant is lh·in.rJ at the time
uJzen sen_:icc i.s made.'
"That is, where a person abides-lives-at
the particular time when the sun1mons is served,
constitutes his usual place of abode. A similar
question ·was before the Supre1ne Court of the
United States in Earle v. McVeigh, 91 U.S. (503)
at page 508, 23 L. Ed. 398, where it is held that,
where service of summons is required to be made
at the 'usual place of abode' such service, in order
to constitute legal service, 1nust be 1nade at the
defendant's 'then present residence.' In othe1·
1rords, at the place where the defendant then lives
or abides.' (Italics ours)
\Ye think the interpretation given the
phrase 'usual place of abode' in Grant v. Lawrence, supra, is correct. \V e must assume the
legislature used the phrase advisedly. Had it
1neant 'residence' or 'domicile' it would have used
one of those terms as it n1ust have been well aware
of the 1neanings which the courts have given those
words. The usual place of abode of a person is
where he usually lives or abides.
"(1)

"Under the rule of Grant v. Lawrence, ~upra,
the question in this case becomes: \Y as Frank
Fairbanks lirhi{J at his parents' home on Decemher 13, 19-1-5, when thr copy of the su1n1nons was
left there1
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''li--,rank joined the navy and eight days before
the copy of the summons was left at the Fairbanks
home departed from this state to start training
at a navy base in California. Before entering the
navy and departing for duty, his ordinary activities of living were centered around and focused
at his parents' home. He usually ate and slept
there. He returned to his parents' home after
short trips. His clothes and personal belongings
were there and he was tied to that home by ties of
blood and affection. He was ordinarily physically
present at the place or was expected there in a
short time. In short, Frank was living at the
Fairbanks home prior to his departure for navy
service."
Defendants submit that this Court should not decide
that the mere length of time which the person may actually be within the State should be the criterion of
whether or not he is a resident or nonresident. F'or the
Court to make such a decision, the defendants submit
would requue every case to he decided on whether or
not the claimed nonresident stayed within the State a
sufficient number of days to cast doubt on the effacy of
service under our Motor Vehicle Code provision. The
facts of this case demonstrate the dangers of such an
interpretation.

A person with the proper intent and

actually living within the State of rtah could establish
his residence here by a very short stay, while a person
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without the proper intent could be present for years and
rernain a nonresident during the whole period that he
stayed within the State of Utah.
All of the cases seern to adopt the proper test, 'vhich
is: Did the person who is clairned to be a resident actually
intend to n1ake the State of Utah his horne f \Vhen applying this test to the facts on which Judge Yan Cott made
his decision, it is subnritted that there can be only one
lawful detel'lnination. It is that the evidence supports
the trial court's determination that Howard C. Teague
was a nonresident of the State of Utah on the .fth day of
August, 1952, at the tirne of the accident in which Brandon was injured. It is further subnritted that there is no
evidence, either substantial or otherwise, which would
support a finding that Teague was a resident of the State
of Utah and intended to rnake his horne here on August
4, 1952.

CONCLUSION
Defendants subn1it that the detel'lnination of residency or nonresidency is a question of fact and that the
trial court properly determined that Howard C. Teague
was a nonresident on August 4, 1952. This deternrination
is supported by substantial evidence and therefor this
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Court should dismiss the complaint of the plaintiff filed
in the above entitled Court and should determine that the
District Court of the Third Judicial District in and for
Nalt Lake Count~~ had jurisdiction over plaintiff, Howard

C. rreague, and that

Ca~e

No. 99973 may be pursued to

its ultimate determination.
Respectfully submitted,
RA \VLIXG~, \VALLACE,
ROBERTS & BLACK:,
DWIGHT L. KING

Counsel for Defendarnts
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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